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Abstract. Technological change is responsible for major changes in the labor market. One of 
the offspring of technological change is the SBTC, which is for many economists the leading 
cause of the increasing wage inequality. However, despite that the technological change 
affected similarly the majority of the developed countries, nevertheless, the level of the 
increase of wage inequality wasn't similar. Following the predictions of the SBTC theory, the 
different levels of inequality could be due to varying degrees of skill inequality between 
economies, possibly caused by variations in the number of skilled workers available. 
However, recent research shows that the difference mentioned above can explain a small 
percentage of the difference between countries. Therefore, most of the resulting inequality 
could be due to the different ways in which the higher level of skills is valued in each labor 
market. The position advocated in this article is that technological change is largely given 
for all countries without much scope to reverse. Therefore, in order to illustrate the changes 
in the structure of wage distribution that cause wage inequality, we need to understand how 
technology affects labor market institutions.In this sense, the pay inequality caused by 
technological progress is not a phenomenon we passively accept. On the contrary, 
recognizing that the structure and the way labor market institutions function is largely 
influenced by the way institutions respond to technological change, we can understand and 
maybe reverse this underlying wage inequality. Consequently, we would like to examine to 
what extent the reason behind the increase of wage inequality in some countries but not in 
others is attributed to the structure and the way the institutions of labor market work. In this 
article, we will attempt to examine this hypothesis by empirically elaboratingon the 
relationship between SBTC, inequality and labor market institutions. 
Keywords. Wage inequality, SBTC, Minimum wage, Trade unions, Collective bargaining. 
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1. Introduction 
he causes of rising wage inequality in recent decades have been the 
subject of research in the area of labor economics. Technological 
change has brought about major changes in the labor market. The 
result of technological change is the SBTC where for many researchers is 
the cause of rising wage inequality (Krueger, 1993). Although technology 
has affected all developed countries to a similar degree, the magnitude of 
the increase in wage inequality was not similar. Following the predictions 
of the SBTC theory, the different levels of inequality could be due to 
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varying degrees of skill inequality between economies, possibly caused by 
variations in the number of skilled workers available. However, recent 
research (Blum & Guerin-Pace, 2000; Devroye & Freeman, 2001) shows that 
the difference mentioned above can explain only 7% of the difference 
between different countries. Therefore, most of the resulting inequality 
could be due to the different ways in which the higher level of skills are 
valued in each labor market. 
In this prism, the research hypothesis we will consider is that the reason 
that wage inequality has not increased in all industrialized countries in the 
same way is that the diversity of labor market institutions is responsible for 
the different valuation of skills in the economy, by squeezing distribution 
of earnings in the labor market and thus making technological change less 
skill-biased. Technological progress in this sense is more endogenous and 
the assumption that it is solely responsible for pay inequality has a fatalistic 
connotation. The position advocated in this article is that technological 
change is largely given for all countries without much scope to reverse. 
Therefore, in order to illustrate the changes in the structure of wage 
distribution that cause wage inequality, we need to understand how 
technology affects labor market institutions. 
In this sense, the pay inequality caused by technological progress is not 
a phenomenon we passively accept. On the contrary, recognizing that the 
structure and the way labor market institutions function is largely 
influenced by the way institutions respond to technological change, we can 
understand and maybe reverse this underlyingwage inequality. 
In the following sections, we will attempt to examine the 
aforementioned research hypothesis by examining the relationship 
between SBTC and inequality and the relationship of labor market 
institutions (minimum wage, degree of centralization of wage bargaining 
and the role of wage labor) with the level of pay inequality. The choice of 
these institutions for consideration is not random. The fact that there is a 
correlation between minimum wage and inequality is widely accepted in 
the literature. We, therefore, want to examine this correlation empirically as 
the existence of a minimum wage sets a binding lower pay level that affects 
the level of wage inequality for low-wage (and usually low-skilled) 
workers. 
The degree of centralization of wage bargaining likewise appears from 
the literature to be largely related to the reduction in the extent of wage 
distribution causing a reduction in inequality. Finally, the decline in 
membership of labor unions and the reduction of their influence on wage 
setting, particularly during the 1980s, has been linked to increased wage 
inequality, particularly in the US and the United Kingdom (Card, 1992; 
DiNardo, Fortin, & Lemieux, 1996; Fortin & Lemieux, 1997; Freeman, 1991; 
Lee, 1999). Of course, one could also mention other labor market 
institutions that may affect wage inequality, but the ones mentioned above 
are the most prevalent.In conclusion, we will empirically investigate all 
these labor market institutions by examining their correlation with the level 
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of inequality in eight OECD countries in order to identify the institutional 
causes behind the increase in inequality observed in recent decades. 
 
2. Theory and literature 
2.1. SBTC as a cause of the increasing wage inequality 
As noted above, inequality can be either the result of technological 
change that is causing changes in the demand for skills in the labor market 
or due to institutional factors. According to the first reason, wage 
inequality is the way the labor market reacts to new working conditions 
caused by changes in the skills of workers. The SBTC is the result of a 
growing demand for highly skilled workers at the expense of the demand 
for unskilled labor. In this way, companies are forced to expand the payroll 
of their employees in order to attract the specialized employees they need. 
In this new wage distribution created, some workers (usually the most 
skilled) benefit because their marginal productivity is higher than others. 
This high inequality is difficult to be reduced without losing part of the 
efficiency of the labor market, as trying to reduce it would require reforms 
that would increase unemployment and affect competitiveness due to 
higher wage costs affecting unit costs of the product. This is due to the fact 
that countries that allow higher wage inequality at the lower level of wage 
distribution (usually translated into lower wages) usually achieve higher 
levels of employment.Until the 1980s, wage inequality remained largely 
flat. As Blinder observed (1980, p.2) the inequality in the United States in 
1977 was almost similar to that in 1947. However, the increase in the levels 
of pay inequality became apparent in the 1980s. This rise was initially not 
easily understood from where it came from as some researchers even 
considered it a consequence of the deep recession of 1981-1982. 
The causes behind rising inequality began to crystallize in the 1990s, 
where a series of research articles linking rising inequality to the SBTC was 
released (Autor, Katz, & Krueger, 1997; Bound & Johnson, 1992; Juhn, 
Murphy, & Pierce, 1993; Katz & Murphy, 1992; Krueger, 1993; Levy & 
Murnane, 1992). 
According to the SBTC theory, by using technology can produce more 
product with the same number of production factors. This increase in 
efficiency is what drives the technological progress of skilled labor, which 
greatly increases the demand for workers with specialized knowledge and 
skills and thus increases their earnings by widening the inequality of 
employees' labor income. 
The theoretical starting point of this literature began with the empirical 
observation that the supply of skilled labor and its remuneration increase 
simultaneously only if the demand for skilled labor increases significantly. 
This increase in demand is a factor that demonstrates the beginnings of 
SBTC. All of the above combined with the time when the rise of inequality 
began (a few years after the creation of personal computers in the early 
1980s) gave rise to the prevailing view that the emergence of new 
technologies caused the increase in the demand for skilled labor, 
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magnifying the pay gap. This theory continued to monopolize scientific 
debate until the early 1990s. 
However, looking at the issue with a time gap of almost three decades 
since the 1990s when scientific research was first published on the 
relationship of inequality with the SBTC, we note that this view does not 
explain as one would expect the increasing inequality over the years 
followed. Although technological breakthroughs have continued rapidly 
since the 1990s (in many cases the 1990s were accompanied by more 
significant technological improvements than the 1980s. A typical example is 
the "Internet revolution" characterized by the growing use of the Internet), 
but the pattern of wage inequality has changed, since the level inequality 
has stabilized in most non-Anglo-Saxon countries. There has been a clear 
differentiation between developed economies since the 1980s. Although 
countries such as France, Germany or Japan have experienced similar 
technological transformations with the United States, there has not been a 
similar increase in inequality. 
Given that technological change is something that has affected all 
developed countries, we would expect inequality to increase in every 
country. However, as we can see in this was not the case. 
 
 
Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 
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Figure 3. 
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Figure 7. 
 
In Figures 1-7 we have shown how much higher is the percentage of a 
worker earning 90% of the payroll than someone earning 50% in 1950-2010 
(the year of the start of the chart varies according to available per country 
data). The data source is the database of Atkinson et al., (2017). In the years 
when no data were available, we estimated prices assuming an equal 
annual change over the interim years. The reason chosen for examining this 
point of pay distribution is to better illustrate the impact of technological 
change on the pay gap in different countries.For this reason, we use as an 
indicator how much higher the remuneration of a worker who is at 90% of 
the payroll than a worker at 50%, because technological change 
differentiates the level of demand for high skills and thus how they are 
paid. As a rule of thumb, skilled workers are in the middle and above the 
payroll. Therefore, looking at the highest end of the distribution we can 
graphically illustrate how SBTC relates to inequality in countries with 
inherent differences in their labor market structure. To illustrate the labor 
hypothesis that increasing inequality is not primarily a result of the SBTC 
per se, but relates to how the labor market responds to technological 
change due to the diversity of its institutions, we look at the examples of 
seven developed OECD countries (Australia, New Zealand, USA, France, 
Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom). All of these countries were 
developed, so technological change greatly affected them in the same way. 
However, by looking at the graphs we see that inequality has not 
increased in the same way in all cases. Looking at the charts of Australia, 
the US, the United Kingdom and New Zealand we see a sharp increase in 
high income inequality in line with what we would expect in the case of 
wage inequality caused by the SBTC.In contrast, in other countries 
(Germany, France, Japan) the level of wage inequality remains largely 
stable, with no linear increase in inequality as a result of technological 
change. From these graphs, we can see that in the first group of countries 
(Australia, New Zealand, USA and the United Kingdom) higher skilled 
workers were receiving higher and higher salaries compared to middle-
skilled workers. In the second group of countries (Germany, France and 
Japan) we find that the skills of skilled workers were not compensated as 
disproportionately high as those of middle skilled workers, demonstrating 
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that technological change either does not cause SBTC and consequently 
increases inequality in each case, or there are other factors in specific 
countries that reduce the SBTC level.As mentioned above, the SBTC has 
similarly affected all technologically advanced countries, but the effect on 
the level of inequality was not similar. From one perspective one could 
argue that this may be due to the fact that while technological change has 
created a greater demand for skilled labor, the number of skilled workers 
that the education system could provide to the economy varied on a case 
by case basis. 
As a result, there has been a significant shift in the demand for skills that 
have favored more skilled workers. In countries where the level of 
remuneration was more flexible (such as in the US), the remuneration of 
the less skilled fell sharply as a result of the reduced demand for low-
skilled workers. In countries where the structure of labor market 
institutions was more robust, wage inequality did not increase to such an 
extent. However, in many cases, unemployment of the less skilled 
increased (Nickell & Bell, 1996). Of course one could argue that this is not 
the case in cases like Germany or the Netherlands for example where 
although the minimum wage is comparatively higher than the US the 
unemployment is not significantly different. This could be explained by the 
different way the education system operates, which creates specific 
minimum acceptable skill levels for each student, resulting in a situation 
that even the less skilled workers having a relatively high level of 
productivity compared to countries such as the US or the United Kingdom 
(Marx, 2007). In this context, in economies where the number of more 
skilled workers was small, their pay would be higher and the higher wages 
would increase inequality (Katz & Murphy, 1992; Murphy, Riddell, & 
Romer, 2003).  
Newer research (Blum & Guerin-Pace, 2000; Devroye & Freeman, 2001), 
however, shows that this difference in the ability of different systems to 
produce skilled workers can account for only 7% of the pay gap between 
countries. Correspondingly, 36% of this inequality for the US can be 
explained by a higher skill premium paid to more skilled workers 
compared to the less skilled.One logical question therefore, is why 
countries value skills and human capital so differently. Our theory is that 
the diversity of labor market institutions squeezes the pay range in a way 
that makes technological change less skill-based. Technological progress in 
this sense has a more endogenous character. Correspondingly, the 
assumption that it is primarily responsible for wage inequality leaves the 
impression that inequality is timeless and little can be done to reverse it. On 
the contrary, the causes of divergent pay disparity should be sought in the 
other institutions of the labor market and in their ability to respond to a 
variety of negative shocks. Anglo-Saxon countries such as the US, 
Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom are characterized by 
decentralized wage bargaining (and hence no or low minimum wage) and 
powerless labor unions, among others. Consequently, a negative impact on 
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the demand for unskilled labor (which could be caused by technological 
change, for example) would have the effect of lowering the salaries of less 
skilled workers. Countries with more centralized wage bargaining, higher 
statutory minimum wage and stronger labor unions would react differently 
to a negative demand shock (mainly of the less skilled workers) because 
their wage levels would remain unchanged, keeping the wage inequality 
stable. 
Even in the United States, it appears that the degree of participation in 
labor unions is largely related to inequality. According to Card (1992), the 
decline in participation causes a 20% increase in men's salary fluctuations 
in 1980. Besides, the reduction in the real minimum wage is important in 
increasing disparity since most of the inequality is at the lower end of the 
wage distribution in the US (Atkinson, Hasell, Morelli, & Roser, 2017; Card 
& DiNardo, 2002; Lemieux, 2008). Looking at the above as a whole, we find 
that the explanation of the SBTC as the main cause of the inequality 
observed between 1980 and 1990 is less convincing than the diversity of 
labor market institutions. In the following sections, we will examine the 
labor market institutions separately in order to try to assess the impact of 
each on increasing inequality. 
 
2.2. Institutional factors as a cause of wage inequality 
The second broader category of causes behind the growing inequality 
are labor market institutions. As it was clear from the previous section, 
SBTC's argument as the main cause of pay inequality ceases to be 
particularly convincing. Countries with a more concentrated wage 
distribution usually also have a more concentrated distribution of skills in 
the labor market. At first glance we would assume that this observation is 
compatible with the SBTC but looking deeper into the problem we would 
observe that perhaps the most important 'crack' in this view is the case of 
the Scandinavian countries. In the US and the rest of the Anglo-Saxon 
countries, both wage distribution and skills fluctuations have been 
observed at the same time as a result of the better return on investment of 
skills of workers. However, in the Scandinavian countries, although the 
level of skills is particularly broad, the level of wage inequality is one of the 
lowest in the world (therefore the wage distribution is quite compressed). 
This may be related to the nature of the education system operating 
differently than in the Anglo-Saxon countries.In addition, how workers' 
skills are valued is different due to differences in the structure of labor 
market institutions in countries with low inequality. In this light, 
institutions such as the minimum wage, the role of trade unions and the 
structure of wage bargaining should be considered. Although we try to 
look at the SBTC separately from the labor market institutions, the 
interaction between them and the overall skill level is undeniable. 
Labor market institutions can influence the distribution of skills in the 
economy when, for example, higher tax rates are raised. So if it were 
consolidated it could change the decisions of the younger generations 
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about the level of skills they want to acquire. This is because educational 
decisions are largely made with the available employment opportunities 
and the extent to which pay increases with education. Thus, even in this 
way, the direction that technological change can followmay change 
(Barany, 2011; Broecke, Quintini, & Vandeweyer, 2015). 
 
2.3. Minimum wage and wage inequality 
The level of the minimum wage can affect the level of pay inequality in a 
variety of ways, either negatively or positively. For example: 
• It may affect the direction of technological change as mentioned above 
by intervening in the way low-skilled workers are paid. This will reduce 
the supply of skilled labor by condensing wage distribution and making 
technological change less skill-based. Of course, such a decision would 
have a negative impact on other factors in the economy, making it 
potentially less competitive and efficient. 
• When the level of the minimum wage is extremely low, its impact on 
reducing wage inequality will be very limited. However, we should keep in 
mind that a reasonable increase in the minimum wage could reduce 
inequality. However, this applies up to a certain level of minimum wage 
because if it exceeds the maximum that the economy can afford, inequality 
will increase due to the unemployment that will be caused. 
The two basic theories that explain the importance of minimum wage 
inequality are the redistributive theory (Freeman, 1996) and the theory of 
marginal productivity.According to redistributive theory, the level of the 
minimum wage can affect inequality at the lower end of the wage 
distribution in three ways:  
The first is through consumer products produced by workers who are 
paid the minimum wage. An increase in the minimum wage will cause an 
increase in the cost of production and ultimately will influence the price of 
the product produced. Consequently, the increase in the purchasing power 
of low-wage workers comes through a reduction in the purchasing power 
of other citizens, affecting the level of overall inequality in the wage 
distribution. The second way that the minimum wage may affect wage 
inequality according to the redistributive theory is by reducing the income 
of shareholders of businesses employing low-wage workers. This could be 
the case if the increased production costs due to the increase in the 
minimum wage that was previously passed on to product buyers were 
borne by the companies. In this way, by lowering the profitability of the 
companies, the shareholders or executives' incomes are reduced, thus 
indirectly reducing inequality between high and low pay levels. Lastly, the 
minimum wage affects wage inequality through unemployment that may 
cause its increase. A reasonable increase in the minimum wage could 
improve prosperity but when the increase exceeds the maximum tolerance 
levels for the economy then the result will be an increase in unemployment 
and a consequent increase in inequality (Litwin, 2015).  
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The second theory that attempts to capture the relationship between 
minimum wage and inequality is the theory of marginal productivity. 
According to this theory, the pay gap between employees is caused by their 
different skills. Skilled employees or otherwise more qualified receive a 
higher salary. The theory we are examining recognizes three different 
levels of competence from which three scenarios emerge: low, moderate 
and high skills. In this model of economy that we are considering as an 
example, there may be a "covered" and "uncovered" sector in the sense that 
the "uncovered" may either have fewer or no benefits in the event of 
unemployment than the "covered" (e.g. fixed-term workers who may not be 
entitled to unemployment benefit, self-employed or other categories who 
for any reason are paid below the minimum wage, etc.) (Litwin, 2015). In 
this economy that we are examining as an example to understand the 
theory of marginal productivity, the workers who are paid the minimum 
wage but who work in the "covered sector" are those with moderate skills 
who are most affected by the fluctuation of the minimum wage. The 
lowest-skilled workers are absorbed into the "uncovered sector". If the 
minimum wage increases, then the demand for work in the covered sector' 
increases on the part of the workers, thereby reducing the demand for the 
uncovered. As a result increasing the wages there. This increase in the 
salaries of non-skilled workers reduces inequality without decreasing the 
salaries of skilled workers. But if the increase in the minimum wage in the 
"covered sector" is greater than the economy can afford, it will cause 
unemployment, causing many workers to seek work in the "uncovered 
sector", reducing the wages there. In this case, the disparity between low-
skilled and highly skilled workers will widen. Finally, if the covered sector' 
increases substantially the minimum wage and creates unemployment but 
the wage in the uncovered sector' is clearly lower than the wage demand of 
the new unemployed coming from the covered sector then due to reduced 
labor supply they will increase the salaries of workers in the "uncovered 
sector" reducing inequality (Litwin, 2015).  
Since a significant number of OECD countries whether they have 
statutory minimum wages or the majority workforce is covered by 
collective agreements, it is not very common for a large proportion of 
workers to be employed in an "uncovered sector". In this sense, the number 
of workers who are paid below the minimum wage is not large enough to 
affect the inequality in the ways mentioned. Therefore, the redistributive 
theory seems to prevail. 
Based on the aforementioned points, we see that the minimum wage 
should, in theory, be related to the level of wage inequality in the economy. 
The level of the minimum wage is largely influenced by how the wage is 
set. The diversity in the ways in which minimum wages are determined 
from country to country explains the existence of so many different 
trajectories of wage inequality. In summary, the statutory minimum wage 
is more likely to reduce the range of wage distribution and thus wage 
inequality due to its legally binding nature which makes it less likely to be 
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circumvented than a minimum wage determined by collective bargaining. 
Because the minimum wage is by definition the same for all workers in the 
economy, irrespective of the sector in which they are employed or their 
jobs, there is less cross-sectoral wage inequality.  
When the minimum wage is determined by collective bargaining with 
binding nature for all workers in the industry, then the levels of wage 
inequality are comparable (but possibly slightly worse) to those that would 
result through the prism of a legally set minimum wage. The problem, 
however, is that in many cases not all workers in the industry are bound by 
the individual agreement signed by the labor union. In this case, inequality 
will increase because workers who are not members of the labor union will 
be paid lower than those who are members.  
 
2.4. Correlation between the level of wage bargaining and the level 
of wage inequality 
Another factor affecting the wage distribution is the degree of 
centralization of payroll negotiations. To a large extent, the increasing 
inequality observed in recent years is due to the decentralized trends in 
most countries worldwide. To make the labor market more flexible and 
reduce unemployment rates, governments are trying to decentralize wage 
bargaining to the detriment of the general level of wage 
inequality.According to Calmfors & Driffill's  (1988) hypothesis, the degree 
of centralization of wage bargaining is an important determinant of a 
country's macroeconomic performance and competitiveness in the sense 
that it affects the level of real wages and thus the unemployment rate. 
According to Calmfors and Driffill's theory, centralized and decentralized 
wage bargaining performs better than sectoral wage bargaining, in terms of 
competitiveness and unemployment. The theoretical starting point of 
Calmfors and Driffill's research was the observation that countries such as 
Sweden, Austria or Norway had very good employment performance. 
Their explanation for this phenomenon was based on the existence of a 
centralized wage bargaining system. At the same time, in countries with 
decentralized wage bargaining (for example, the United Kingdom or 
Canada) even if they had higher unemploymentthe labor market flexibility 
was superior. 
These observations led the authors to conclude that the two ends (either 
decentralization at the operational level or centralization at the national 
level) work better than intermediate forms of negotiation (sectoral 
negotiations). The explanation given for this observation is that in the case 
of centralization, there are large and centralized labor unions that 
understand their particular strengths and take into account the impact of 
their wage effects on unemployment and inflation. 
On the other hand, in decentralized bargaining systems where 
bargaining takes place within each business, labor unions have very limited 
power that does not allow them to have excessive demands. In the case of 
wage bargaining at the sectoral level, labor unions have considerable 
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power but operating in an environment larger than that of a business but 
smaller than that of a national economy leads them to ignore the 
macroeconomic consequences of their claims, believing that they do not 
affect the rest of the economy. In this light, Calmfors and Driffill have 
argued that on the one hand centralization acts as a way of taking into 
account the broader interests, while on the other hand decentralization 
necessarily forces actors to limit their requirements to follow the 
peculiarities of the market. In both cases, however, wage restraint is 
achieved in both cases. Observing the graphical representation of this 
finding in a graph, we will see that it is hump-shaped. 
According to Calmfors & Driffill's (1988) theory, a decentralized and 
centralized wage bargaining system could have the same effects on 
employment. However, in their theory, they did not mention the factor of 
wage inequality. These two payroll systems have different wage 
distributions, with the result that the overall level of wage inequality in the 
economy also differs. 
When wage bargaining is centralized, wage inequality tends to be lower 
for two reasons: the first is ideological and the second is political. The 
ideological starts from the theoretical starting point that in collective 
bargaining, workers' representatives are interested in having as much 
justice as possible in the way members of the labor union are paid. This in 
itself does not alter the level of inequality in payroll systems as it would 
potentially apply even when there is total decentralization. The point is, 
however, that looking at this issue in terms of human resources 
management would have a significant impact on profitability, productivity 
and in general the attitude of employees towards the business. In a 
centralized wage bargaining institutional environment, the sense of fairness 
that results from the structure of wage distribution has an impact not only 
on the staff of an individual business but on a large portion of the 
workforce as a whole. 
Consequently, this sense of justice is central during a centralized 
negotiation resulting in a more concentrated pay distribution (Wallerstein, 
1999). This preference of labor unions for condensing skills pay and 
productivity is partly the reason that there is a lower degree of inequality in 
high incomes than in decentralized payroll systems. An extension thus, this 
explains the increase in high income inequality in countries with weak 
labor unions (Lemieux, 2008). 
The second factor that holds back inequality when wage negotiations are 
centralized is political. A centralized wage bargain involving numerous 
smaller labor unions differentiates each one's influence on wage setting. 
Consequently, precisely because the leaders of each labor union wish to be 
re-elected, the average voter in the wage setting is taken into account. The 
result of this move is to increase the remuneration of average voters by 
increasing their remuneration to the detriment of high salaries. This attracts 
those below the middle of the wage distribution as well, resulting in 
reduced pay inequality (Wallerstein, 1999).  
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To a large extent, and because of Europe's economic crisis, in recent 
years countries have been trying to reform their wage bargaining systems 
in order to reduce unemployment. In general, the more decentralized 
systems take fuller account of the financial conditions prevailing in each 
business. This determines the wage of employees based on the real 
potential of the economy, industry or business respectively. Precisely 
because the particularities of each business are taken into account (either 
positive such as the increased productivity a company may have, or 
negative) in determining the amount of wage unemployment tends to be 
much lower. The price for this, however, is the widening of the pay gap 
and the consequent increase in inequality. 
The effects of technological change on inequality have begun to be seen 
since 1980. In Germany, an increase in high income inequality became 
apparent in late 1980and later in 1990, it began to expand at a slower pace 
than the US and at the bottom of the wage distribution. This shift in 
inequality and the widening of wage distribution coincides with the 
institutional reforms that have begun in the German labor market. Until 
that time, they kept inequality at a lower level and differentiated in the way 
the wage distribution would respond in comparison to the Anglo-Saxon 
countries. However, the price for this lower wage inequality was higher 
unemployment. In order to increase the flexibility of the labor market, 
Germany has introduced reforms aimed at entering the labor market of the 
economically inactive population (which were largely paid with low 
salaries resulting in increasing inequality). At the same time, the power of 
trade unions was reduced and the remumeration became clearly connected 
with the personal productivity resulting in increased inequality at the top 
ends of the wage distribution (Dell Aringa & Pagani, 2005). 
 
2.5. The relation between trade unions and wage inequality 
By 1970, the prevailing view was that labor unions were increasing 
inequality. This, as we shall see below, has a solid theoretical basis but is 
not empirically confirmed. Freeman (1980) has shown that although the 
action of trade unions has a dual nature in terms of the impact on 
inequality, their role as a factor in reducing wage inequality prevails. 
Observing the trajectory of wage inequality in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, we can see that these two countries have seen a huge 
increase in inequality at the same time as the decline in the number of 
workers being members oftrade unions.  
The role of trade unions in wage inequality can have a dual nature: 
either negatively or positively. On the one hand, labor unions increase the 
earnings of their members more than the earnings of non-members by 
exerting pressure on employers' representatives. This increase in the 
remuneration of union members over other workers changes the way 
remuneration is distributed throughout the economy. When most members 
of a labor union are highly skilled employees then pay inequality tends to 
increase. However, in cases where members of the labor union are low-
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
V. Tsoukatou. JEPE, 6(4), 2019, p.323-343. 
336 
336 
wage workers, wage inequality is reduced (Freeman, 1980). Given the 
technological change of recent years, it is more likely that members of labor 
unions tend to be paid salaries at the bottom end of the payroll, negatively 
affecting inequality. On the other hand, the existence of trade unions can 
promote wage equality in three ways: by imposing specific pay scales on an 
independent basis for all employees so that all employees of a company 
working in the same job function are paid the same. The second way of 
narrowing the range of wage distribution is by reducing wage differentials 
between manual and non-manual employees.In many cases, most of the 
members of the trade unions are manual workers, so the levels of 
remuneration for non-manual employees are negotiated in such a way that 
most of the salary increase goes to the most numerous category of workers 
within the union: that is, the manual workerswith salaries near the bottom 
of the wage distribution (Asher & DeFina, 1995).  
Finally, the third and perhaps most important way to reduce inequality 
is the imposition by the labor unions of specific levels of remuneration for 
each job so that all employees covered by the agreement are paid the same 
as their counterparts in another company if they offer the same services. 
The establishment of a common wage policy per job directly affects the 
wage distribution as wage dispersal within the companies involved is 
reduced. The agreement on uniform pay is a move that is in the interest of 
both companies and employees, and its applicability remains high. From 
the business point of view, it is clear that no company would want the 
remuneration paid to its employees to be higher than the remuneration 
paid by its competitors for the same job. Similarly, it is pleasurable for 
workers because they feel a greater degree of pay equity since their salaries 
are not determined by any other personal characteristics other than their 
job position. In addition, when there is a common wage cost in an industry, 
it is more difficult to reduce earnings in order to reduce the competitive 
price of a product. This may create other problems of flexibility and 
sustainability but nonetheless, it is a question of the unions being achieved, 
so their members have no reason not to welcome it.Although both 
theoretical approaches to labor unions and inequality appear to be 
convincing, several empirical studies show a reduction in wage inequality 
when labor unions exist. This is also the reason why the decline in 
participation rates has been largely linked to the increasing wage inequality 
observed in many countries in recent decades. Especially in the United 
States, the decline in employee participation in labor unions is particularly 
pronounced. Indicatively, it is reported that between 1970 and 1992, 
employee participation decreased by 50% (from 26% to 13%) (Asher & 
DeFina, 1995). In general, when an economy is to a small extent exposed to 
technological change (largely due to its productive structures) then the 
benefits of an employee from joining trade unions outweigh the limitations 
of the wage distribution imposed. But when the impact of the SBTC is 
severe, skilled workers no longer wish to join trade unions. This is because 
the productivity gap between skilled workers and non-skilled workers is 
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increasing rapidly due to new production technologies making skilled 
workers more sought after. In this sense, since they know that their work 
future is secured either by the existing employer or someone else, they do 
not want to join labor unions that squeeze their earnings for the benefit of 
their less skilled members (Gordon, 2001). Furthermore, given the existence 
of technological change in developed countries, we would conclude that 
most members of labor unions are middle- or low-skilled. Following the 
reasoning outlined above, precisely because union members are less 
specialized, their representatives will push for fixing wage levels that 
reduce inequality and condense wage distribution. 
 
2.6. Causes behind the decline of trade union participation rates 
Bibliographically, one of the main institutional factors that have 
contributed to the growing wage inequality has been the decline in labor 
unions participation rates. As mentioned above, SBTC is an important 
factor in reducing participation. Skilled employees who know that through 
their expanded skills are secured their work future do not want to become 
union members as they limit the range of their remuneration. On the 
contrary, if they negotiate directly at the company level their 
remuneration,they are able to agree on significantly higher wages. Another 
factor contributing to the decline in participation has to do with the 
structural changes that are gradually transforming economies. In previous 
years the majority of jobs were in industry / manufacturing where it was 
easier for workers to join labor unions. On the contrary, in recent years the 
institutional transition of several economies, from production economies to 
service economies, has been completed. This is because globalization has 
drived the production process to less costly developing economies where 
workers' wages are lower. The result is that the main occupation of most of 
the workers in these countries has shifted to sectors focusing on providing 
services where it is more difficult to harmonize the policies imposed by a 
labor union. Precisely for this reason, participation declines as their 
narrative is significantly narrower.Finally, another reason for the decline in 
labor unions is that some of the services previously provided by labor 
unions are now secured by the state. For example, in some countries in the 
past, labor unions were tasked with creating security and worker 
protection rules, distributing unemployment benefits, retirement plans and 
setting working hours. Consequently, many of the workers who previously 
joined labor unions for the aforementioned reasons have no reason to 
continue to be unionized. 
 
3. Data set and method 
3.1. The model  
In this section, we present the model we have constructed to test 
whether the institutional factors examined, in theory, affect wage 
inequality in practice. The period we are looking at in this empirical study 
is from 1980 to 2016, given that the 1980s is the decade when the SBTC 
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peaked and there was a significant increase in wage inequality. In order to 
proceed with the creation of the final multivariate linear regression model 
to test the influence of each of these variables (union density, degree of 
centralization, GDP, (deflated) minimum wage and collective bargaining 
coverage) we used as wage inequality metric the ratios 90/10, 50/10 and 
90/50. Besides the labor market institutions, we examined in the previous 
section, in this model we also use as a variable the level of deflated GDP 
and the collective bargaining coverage. The deflated GDP was used to have 
an index that reflects the general state of economic activity. According to 
Deaton (2013, p.4), economic growth per se since the Industrial Revolution 
has been associated with increasing inequality. The sample used to create 
the model includes eight OECD countries (Australia, Belgium, France, 
USA, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Canada) that were 
industrialized during the period we are examining - so affected largely 
similar to technological change, they had a statutory minimum wage in 
place and their labor market institutions were diverse (varying degrees of 
centralization, union density, and coverage of collective bargaining). 
In order to examine the influence of each of these variables as stated 
above, three multiple linear regressions were applied to substantially check 
the relationship of one dependent continuous variable each time (the 90/10, 
50/10 or 90/50 ratios respectively) and five continuous independent 
variables (deflated minimum wage, collective bargaining coverage, degree 
of centralization of wage bargaining, union density and deflated GDP). In 
our analysis, it was observed that two of the model assumptions (the 
assumption of regularity and the assumption of homoscedasticity in 
particular) are violated. More precisely, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Shapiro-Wilks tests gave us a p-value of 0.000 <0.05, thus we reject the null 
hypothesis that the residuals of the model follow a normal distribution. 
Similarly, in the case of homoscedasticity, the residuals plots appear to 
have a pattern and not to be random. In order to correct the hypotheses, 
some transformations were used in either the dependent variable or the 
explanatory variables, or both types of variables. After testing our model 
we found that it is best to transform some of the explanatory variables 
(deflated minimum wage and deflated GDP). As a transformation we used 
logarithm. 
 
3.2. Results 
According to the multivariate analysis applied, it was found that all 
factors had a statistically significant effect on the 90/10 inequality. 
Specifically, from Table 1 we observe that multiple regression was found to 
be statistically significant (F (5,277) = 259,055, p-value <0.001), with R2 = 
0.821). Regarding the deflated minimum wage, it is observed that one 
percentage point increase is associated with a reduction of inequality of 
90/10 by 0.006 (-0.606*ln(
101
100
 units while maintaining the other variables 
constant. 
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Table 1. Presenting the results for 90/10 
 
 
Regarding collective bargaining coverage, it is observed that for one unit 
of increase we expect a decrease of inequality of 90/10 by 0.003 units while 
maintaining the other variables constant. Concerning the degree of 
centralization of wage bargaining, it is observed that for one unit of 
increase we expect a reduction of the inequality of 90/10 by 0.191 units 
keeping the other variables constant. On the contrary, for the union 
density, it is observed that for one unit of increase we expect an increase of 
inequality of 90/10 by 0.011 units keeping the remaining variables constant. 
Finally, we observe that a percentage increase in deflated GDP is expected 
to increase inequality 90/10 by 0.003 (0.369*ln(
101
100
))  units while maintaining 
the other variables constant. 
 
Table 2. Presenting the results for 50/10 
 
 
According to the multivariate analysis applied, it was found that all 
factors had a statistically significant effect on the 50/10 inequality. 
Specifically, from Table 2 we observe that multiple regression was found to 
be statistically significant (F (5,277) = 145.867, p-value <0.001), with R2 = 
0.719. Regarding the deflated minimum wage, it is observed that a 1% 
increase is associated with a reduction of inequality of 50/10 by 0.002 (-
0.177*ln(
101
100
))  units keeping the other variables constant. Concerning 
collective bargaining coverage, it is observed that for one unit of increase 
we expect a 50/10 inequality to decrease by 0.001 units while keeping the 
other variables constant. 
Regarding the degree of centralization of wage bargaining, it is observed 
that for one unit of growth we expect a 50/10 inequality to decrease by 
0.111 units while keeping the other variables constant. On the contrary, for 
the union density, it is observed that for one unit of increase we expect an 
increase of inequality of 50/10 by 0.007 units keeping the other variables 
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constant. According to the literature, there is a correlation between a 
decrease in union membership and an increase in inequality. Prior 
empirical research does not normally take into account the years after the 
late 1990s. This factor may also have influenced the result obtained as a 
regression coefficient. According to our research, 1 unit of increase in 
inequality is related to 0.011 units of increase in union density. One 
hypothesis that could explain this effect of linear regression would be the 
diversification of labor composition in recent years. In recent years, the 
general level of education in developed economies has increased, resulting 
in an increase in the number of skilled workers. As the number of high-
skilled employees increases, it is more likely this increase to alter the 
constitution of the trade unions by having more highly skilled members. In 
this way, the profile of the 'average worker/member' is also changed and 
consequently, their role in reducing the extent of pay distribution becomes 
questionable. Finally, it is observed that for an increase of 1% of deflated 
GDP we expect an increase of inequality of 50/10 by 0.001 (0.099*ln(
101
100
)) 
units keeping the other variables constant. 
 
Table 3. Presenting the results for 90/10 
 
 
Finally, in the latter model, according to the multivariate analysis 
applied, it was found that all factors again have a statistically significant 
effect on 90/50 inequality. Specifically, from Table 3 we observe that 
multiple regression was found to be statistically significant (F (5,277) = 
199.452, p-value <0.001), with R2 = 0.783. 
Regarding the deflated minimum wage, it is observed that a 1% increase 
is associated with a reduction of the 90/50 inequality by 0.001 (-
0.137*ln(
101
100
)) units while keeping the other variables constant. Concerning 
collective bargaining coverage, it is observed that for one unit of increase, 
the inequality of 90/50 is expected to decrease by 0.001 units while 
maintaining the other variables constant. On the contrary, regarding the 
degree of centralization of wage bargaining, it is observed that for one unit 
of growth we expect an increase of 90/50 inequality by 0.002 units while 
maintaining the other variables constant. Concerning the union density, it 
is observed that for one unit of increase, a 90/50 inequality is expected to 
decrease by 0.004 units while maintaining the other variables constant. 
Finally, it is observed that a percentage increase in deflated GDP is 
expected to increase the 90/50 inequality by 0.001 (0.092*ln(
101
100
)) units. 
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4. Findings 
This chapter deals with the issue of increasing wage inequality. Since the 
early 1980s, there has been an increasing wage inequality initially 
attributed to the impact of technological change and the resulting 
technological progress of the Skill Biased Technical Change (SBTC). Our 
working hypothesis was based on the fact that if all industrialized countries 
were exposed to technological change, the pay gap would have to be 
affected correspondingly. 
This was not the case, and in order to explain this phenomenon, many 
different causes have been proposed, such as the inherent differences 
between the educational systems of each country how each economy is 
valued the highest level of education and skills. Therefore, the hypothesis 
we examined was that wage inequality depends primarily on how labor 
market institutions (minimum wage, degree of centralization of wage 
bargaining, and the role of labor unions) respond to the given technological 
change and influence how the skills and human capital are valued in 
general. According to our empirical research, the labor market institutions 
examined justify 82.1% of the increase in wage inequality (as defined by the 
wage inequality 90/10) while the remaining 17.9% could be due to other 
reasons such as the different magnitude of technological change among 
countries. In different parts of the wage distribution (50/10 and 90/50) the 
degree of inequality due to labor market institutions is 71.9% and 77.9% 
respectively. All in all, the main factor in the labor market related to wage 
inequality is the level of the lower wage (-0.606 in the wage inequality 
90/10) followed by (in two of the three models) GDP growth rate (0.369 in 
90/10) demonstrating the general level of economic growth. Similarly, the 
degree of centralization of wage bargaining (-0.191 in the 90/10 
distribution) and the trade union density (0.011 in the 90/10 distribution) is 
a notable factor of increasing inequality in both of the three models. Finally, 
the least significant factor regarding the level of wage inequality is the 
degree of coverage of collective bargaining (-0.003 in the wage inequality 
model 90/10). 
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